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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been
demonstrated as a viable solution to detector side-channel attacks. One of the main advantages
of MDI-QKD is that the security can be proved without making any assumptions about how the
measurement device works. The price to pay is the relatively low secure key rate comparing with con-
ventional QKD, such as the decoy-state BB84 protocol. To bridge the strong security of MDI-QKD
with the high efficiency of conventional QKD, a new type of QKD protocol, the detector-device-
independent (DDI) QKD has been proposed recently. In this protocol, the legitimate receiver
employs a trusted linear optics network to encode information on photons received from an insecure
quantum channel, and then performs a single-photon Bell state measurement (BSM) using untrusted
detectors. One crucial assumption made in DDI-QKD is that the untrusted BSM located inside the
receiver’s laboratory cannot send any unwanted information to the outside. Here, we show that
if the BSM is completely untrusted and the expected detection efficiency is low, a simple scheme
would allow the BSM to send information to the outside: a sophisticated eavesdropper (Eve) can
place high-efficiency detectors inside the BSM and program it to selectively report a fraction of
the total detection events to simulate low-efficiency detectors. The time delay between adjacent
reported events can be used by the BSM to send information. Combined with Trojan horse attacks,
this scheme could allow Eve to gain information of the quantum key without being detected. To
prevent the above attack, either countermeasures to Trojan horse attacks or some trustworthiness
to the “untrusted” BSM device is required.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two authen-
ticated users, normally referred to as Alice and Bob,
to generate a private key through an insecure quantum
channel controlled by an eavesdropper, Eve [1–5]. Based
on fundamental laws in quantum mechanics, idealized
QKD protocols have been proved to be uncondition-
ally secure against adversaries with unlimited comput-
ing power and technological capabilities [6–8]. However,
practical implementations of QKD protocols unavoidably
contain imperfections which may be overlooked in the
security proofs. The disconnection between QKD the-
ory and its real-life implementations has led to various
“side-channel” attacks [9–24].
One natural solution to the above side-channel attacks
is to develop security patches [25–29]. In fact, once a se-
curity loophole has been identified, normally it is not
too difficult to develop countermeasures to regain the
security. This approach is appealing in practice since
it typically can be realized by slightly modifying either
the QKD protocol or its implementation, and the result-
ing key rate could be comparable with that of the orig-
inal protocol. However the security can only be proved
against known attacks.
Another important approach to enhance the secu-
rity of practical QKD is to develop QKD protocols
∗ qib1@ornl.gov
based on “untrusted” device [30–34]. Among them,
the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD pro-
tocol [33], has received much attention [35–40]. The
MDI-QKD protocol is automatically immune to all side-
channel attacks associated with the measurement device
which, arguably, is the weakest link in a QKD system.
In fact, the measurement device in MDI-QKD can be
treated as a “black box” which could even be manufac-
tured and operated by Eve. The feasibility of MDI-QKD
has been demonstrated experimentally [41–46]. See [47]
for a recent review.
One drawback of MDI-QKD is the relatively low se-
cure key rate comparing with conventional QKD, such
as the decoy-state BB84 protocol. This is because in
most of existing MDI-QKD protocols (except [35]), se-
cure keys are generated from two-fold coincidence detec-
tion events. The MDI-QKD suffers more from the low
detection efficiency of a practical single-photon detector
(SPD), especially when the finite data size effect is taken
into account [5].
Recently a new QKD protocol, designed to bridge the
strong security of MDI-QKD with the high efficiency of
conventional QKD, was proposed by several groups [48–
50]. In this protocol, the legitimate receiver employs a
trusted linear optics network to encode information on
photons received from an insecure quantum channel, and
then performs a Bell state measurement (BSM) using un-
trusted detectors. One important advantage of this ap-
proach is the high key rate comparable with that of a con-
ventional QKD protocol. This is achieved by replacing
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2the probabilistic two-photon BSM scheme in the original
MDI-QKD protocol [33] by a deterministic single-photon
BSM scheme. Following [49], we call this new protocol
“detector-device-independent” (DDI) QKD.
In this paper, we scrutinize the underlying assumptions
behind DDI-QKD. One crucial assumption is that the
untrusted BSM located inside the receiver’s laboratory
cannot send any “unwanted” information to the outside.
Here, we show that if the BSM is completely untrusted, a
simple scheme would allow the BSM to send information
to the outside without being detected: Eve can place
high-efficiency detectors inside the BSM and program
it to selectively report a fraction of the total detection
events to simulate practical low-efficiency detectors. The
time delay between adjacent reported events can be used
by the BSM to send information. Combined with Trojan
horse attacks, this scheme could allow Eve to gain infor-
mation of the secure key without introducing any errors.
Our results suggest that to establish the security of DDI-
QKD, additional assumptions on the measurement device
are required. It is thus very important to clearly spell out
those assumptions and place them under scrutiny.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
briefly review the basic ideas of MDI-QKD and DDI-
QKD. In Section III, we present the details of our attack.
We conclude this paper with a discussion in Section IV.
II. MDI-QKD & DDI-QKD
In a conventional QKD protocol (see Fig.1a), Alice pre-
pares quantum states and sends them to Bob through
an insecure quantum channel. Bob receives signals from
the quantum channel and performs measurement. In
this configuration, it is reasonable to assume that the
errors in quantum state preparation can be well con-
trolled and quantified, since this can be done within Al-
ice’s well protected laboratory without Eve’s interference.
On the other hand, the quantum states received by Bob
are highly unpredictable, since Eve could replace Alice’s
quantum states by anything at her will. Eve can interfere
the measurement process by either manipulating Alice’s
signal [11] or sending her own signals into Bob’s labo-
ratory [15]. The above observation could explain why
most identified security loopholes in conventional QKD
are associated with the measurement device [9–16].
The motivation behind MDI-QKD [33] is to develop a
QKD protocol which is automatically immune to all de-
tector side-channel attacks. In this scheme (see Fig.1b),
both Alice and Bob prepare quantum states and send
them to an untrusted third party, Charlie, who could
be a collaborator of Eve. Charlie is supposed to measure
the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s quantum states
and publicly announce the measurement results. Given
Charlie’s measurement results, Alice and Bob can further
establish a secure key. The protocol has been designed
in such a way that “only” the correlation (but not the
quantum states themselves) can be determined by Char-
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FIG. 1: (a) Conventional QKD; (b)
Measurement-device-independent(MDI) QKD; (c)
Detector-device-independent (DDI)QKD
lie faithfully. On one hand, if Charlie executes the proto-
col honestly, he or Eve cannot gain any information of the
secure key. On the other hand, any attempts by Charlie
to gain information of the secure key will unavoidably
introduce additional noise and can be detected by Alice
and Bob. The security of MDI-QKD is based on the idea
of time-reversed EPR QKD [51, 52]. By allowing Eve to
fully control the measurement device, Alice and Bob can
establish a secure key without making any assumptions
about how the measurement device works, thus remov-
ing any potential detector side-channels. We remark that
MDI-QKD is an ideal building block of multi-user QKD
networks, where the expensive measurement device can
be placed in an untrusted central node while each QKD
user only needs a low-cost state preparation device [44].
Recently DDI-QKD has been proposed to bridge the
strong security of MDI-QKD with the high efficiency of
conventional QKD [48–50]. For simplicity, in this paper
we assume that a perfect single photon source is employed
by Alice. In DDI-QKD (Fig.1c), Alice prepares a single-
photon pulse in one of the four BB84 polarization states
and sends it to Bob through an insecure quantum chan-
nel. On receiving the signals, Bob employs a “trusted”
linear optics network (LON) to encode his information
on a different (for example, spatial) degree of freedom
of the incoming signals. Afterwards, the above signals
are fed into an “untrusted” BSM device which is sup-
posed to perform a single-photon BSM [53] and report
3the measurement results to Bob. Through an authenti-
cated classical channel, Bob announces which transmit-
ted signals have yielded successful BSM detection events,
the Bell states obtained, and the basis information associ-
ated with those successful events. Alice and Bob estimate
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for the events when
they happen to use the same basis. If the QBER is below
certain threshold, they can further apply error correction
and privacy amplification to generate a secure key. Note
in Fig.1c, the untrusted BSM inside Bob’s laboratory is
represented by a “black box”, which is controlled by Eve’s
partner (Fred) during the QKD process.
III. TROJAN HORSE ATTACK IN DDI-QKD
In DDI-QKD, Bob’s encoding device (LON in Fig.1c)
sits between Eve and Fred. In practice, this design could
be prone to Trojan horse attacks. We remark that the
threats of Trojan horse attacks in conventional QKD and
the corresponding countermeasures have been studied
previously [54–56]. In conventional QKD, Eve can only
access one end of each user’s device. To launch a Trojan
horse attack, Eve can send bright light pulses into the
user’s system and tries to gain information by measur-
ing the back-reflected light. In practice, the QKD users
can effectively reduce the risk of Trojan horse attack by
using filters, optical circulators, isolators, and intensity
monitors, etc. However, these countermeasures may not
be effective in the case of DDI-QKD, where Eve and Fred
together can access both ends of Bob’s encoding device.
For example, in each quantum transmission, Eve could
send her own signal (which may contain a few photons)
together with Alice’s photon into Bob’s laboratory. Both
Alice’s and Eve’s signals go through Bob’s encoding de-
vice and reach the BSM. Inside the BSM, Fred could de-
termine Bob’s bit information precisely by measuring the
signal sent by Eve. In the meantime Fred can perform
an honest Bell state measurement on Alice’s photon. In
principle, Fred can have a perfect copy of Bob’s random
bits without introducing any errors.
At this point, security is not compromised since Fred is
confined within Bob’s laboratory. To prevent Fred from
sending Bob’s random bits to Eve, a crucial assumption is
made in DDI-QKD [48, 49]: Fred is only allowed to report
the BSM results to Bob; he cannot send any “unwanted”
information to the outside. However, it could be difficult
to justify the above assumption in practice. Below we
will show that if the BSM is completely untrusted (as in
the case of MDI-QKD), a simple scheme would allow the
untrusted BSM to send information to Eve. Combined
with Trojan horse attacks discussed above, this scheme
could allow Eve to gain information of the final key with-
out being detected.
A practical single photon detector (SPD) at telecom
wavelength has a relatively low detection efficiency (typ-
ically 10% ∼ 30%). On the top of that, all the optical
components inside a practical BSM introduce additional
losses. Under normal operation, Bob would expect a low
detection rate: most of the time, the BSM will report
“no detection”; occasionally, the BSM will report a suc-
cessful BSM result. However, Eve could place SPDs with
much higher efficiency inside the BSM. In this case, the
actual detection rate seen by Fred will be much higher
than the one expected by Bob. Fred can easily simulate a
low-efficiency BSM by reporting to Bob a small fraction
of the total detection events. He can further take advan-
tage of this “post-selection” process to send information
to Eve.
Suppose Fred successfully detects the ith signal sent by
Alice; in the meantime, through the Trojan horse attack,
he also learns Bob’s bit information corresponding to the
same transmission. Fred reports the BSM result to Bob
honestly. He also determines the index number i + k of
the next BSM result to be reported based on the following
rules: if Bob’s ith bit value is 1 (or 0), Fred will report a
BSM result to make sure that k is an even (or odd) num-
ber. In other words, Fred encodes Bob’s random bits on
the time delays between adjacent BSM results reported
to Bob. When Bob publicly announces which signals
from Alice have been detected, Eve can decode Fred’s in-
formation and have a perfect copy of Bob’s random bits.
Since Fred performs BSM on Alice’s signals and reports
the measurement results to Bob honestly, this attack will
not introduce additional errors. To further conceal their
attack, Eve and Fred can use pre-shared random num-
bers to determine whether an even or an odd number is
used to encode bit 1 for each reported BSM event. Fred
can also carefully control the reporting rate to match it
with the one expected by Bob.
This attack, in its spirit, is similar to the memory at-
tack on device-independent (DI) QKD [57], which might
be applicable whenever an untrusted device is placed in-
side Alice’s or Bob’s secure laboratory. On the other
hand, our attack is more feasible since Fred does not need
to access the classical communication channel between
Alice and Bob. All his activities are confined within the
untrusted BSM, as assumed in DDI-QKD.
IV. DISCUSSION
To prevent the above attack, Bob could introduce var-
ious countermeasures to detect Trojan horse attacks, as
suggested in [50]. In practice, additional filtering and
random sampling systems could be introduced into Bob’s
system to characterize the input signals and mitigate the
risk of Trojan horse attacks. However, it is very chal-
lenging in practice to implement single-mode filtering.
Moreover, additional SPDs could be required to imple-
ment the above countermeasures. These SPDs may also
suffer from the same side-channel attacks as the SPDs
for secure key generation.
Another approach to prevent the above attack is to
make additional assumptions about the BSM device [58].
Instead of treating the BSM device as a completely “black
4box”, as we have assumed above, Bob could build the
BSM himself and know what is inside the BSM. In this
case, it may be possible to prove security without per-
fectly modeling the exact behavior of the BSM. Never-
theless, all the assumptions made about the BSM should
be clearly specified and be placed under scrutiny. To
highlight this point, we consider the detector blinding
attack, which has been successfully demonstrated in con-
ventional QKD systems [15].
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FIG. 2: Schematic diagram of the Bell state
measurement (BSM) device employed in
detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD
The basic idea of the detector blinding attack is as
follows [15]. First, Eve sends bright light into Bob’s sys-
tem to force the SPDs into the so-called linear operation
mode. In this mode, the detector remains sensitive to
bright light with a classical optical power threshold Pth.
Second, Eve performs an intercept and resend attack:
she intercepts Alice’s signal, measures it in a randomly
chosen basis, and resends a bright pulse to Bob accord-
ing to her measurement result. The peak power of the
bright pulse is just above Pth. If Bob and Eve happen to
use the same basis, the bright pulse will be conveyed to
one detector and a “click” will be registered. Otherwise,
the optical power of the bright pulse will be distributed
between two SPDs and no detector clicks. Equivalently,
Eve has control of Bob’s measurement basis and it is
easy to show that in principle Eve can learn the whole
key without introducing errors.
The detector blinding attack could also be applied in
DDI-QKD if there are certain overlooked imperfections
in the BSM. Although the actual implementations of the
BSM in [48–50] are slightly different, all of them em-
ploy four SPDs to deterministically identify the four Bell
states, {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉}, as shown in Fig.2. In
normal QKD operation, if Alice and Bob use the same
basis, only two out of the four SPDs have non-zero prob-
ability (50% each in the ideal case) to detect a photon.
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob use different bases,
all the four SPDs have non-zero probability (25% each in
the ideal case) to click.
Suppose Eve launches the detector blinding attack de-
scribed above. The optical power of Eve’s bright pulse
will be distributed either between two SPDs (if Eve and
Bob use the same basis) or among four SPDs (if they use
different bases). By carefully controlling the power of the
bright pulse, Eve can make sure that Bob can register a
detection event only when they use the same basis.
The above attack can be easily detected if the beam
splitters in the BSM are symmetric and all the SPDs
are identical. This is because when Bob and Eve use the
same basis, the optical power of Eve’s bright pulse will be
evenly distributed between two SPDs and result in an un-
usually high double-click rate [29]. However, if we allow
certain uncharacterized imperfections in the BSM, Eve
could refine her attack to make it undetectable. For ex-
ample, if the SPDs have different wavelength-dependent
efficiencies, then Eve could reduce the double-click rate
by tailoring the wavelength of her bright pulse. To rule
out the possibility of the detector blinding attack in DDI-
QKD, we need to quantify the imperfections inside the
BSM carefully, or introduce other countermeasures.
In summary, to improve the security of QKD in prac-
tice, various QKD protocols, including DI-QKD, MDI-
QKD and DDI-QKD, have been proposed. Each of them
has its own advantages and drawbacks, and might be
best for certain applications. In this paper, we inves-
tigate some underlying assumptions in DDI-QKD. Our
results show that if the BSM in DDI-QKD is completely
untrusted, a simple attack could allow Eve to gain in-
formation of the quantum key without being detected.
To prevent the above attack, either countermeasures to
Trojan horse attacks or some trustworthiness to the “un-
trusted” BSM device is required. All these details should
be clearly specified and included in the security analysis.
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